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MAPPING THE NEXUS BETWEEN TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE AND
PEACEBUILDING




This contribution reﬂects upon the nexus between transitional
justice and peacebuilding through a study of how transitional
justice practices in post-Qadhaﬁ Libya interacted with broader
efforts to establish governance institutions in the aftermath of
Libya’s 2011 armed conﬂict. It argues that dominant practices of
transitional justice, promoted by external actors, prescribed
narrow state-centric justice interventions that were ill-suited for a
polity in which the state was highly contested. In fact, transitional
justice proved divisive in Libya because attempts to project state-
centric liberal justice practices were limited by their targeting of
weak institutions that lacked local legitimacy and their inability to
reconcile alternative normative frameworks that challenge the
modern state. In addition, the weakness of Libya’s state
institutions allowed thuwwar, or revolutionary armed groups, to
dictate an exclusionary form of justice known as political isolation.
Drawn from ﬁeldwork conducted in Libya, this contribution
provides lessons for both peacebuilding and transitional justice
practice that call for a rethinking of teleological notions of
transition and greater engagement with notions and concepts





Over the course of the last two decades, the increasingly professionalized body of practice
known as transitional justice, deﬁned by core international legal norms and standards
(United Nations 2010), spearheaded the establishment of a broad range of legal and
quasi-legal mechanisms to address legacies of past violence in a number of countries emer-
ging from conﬂict (Bell 2009, 8–9). This contribution explores the tension between transi-
tional justice practices and local justice discourses through a study of justice interventions
in post-Qadhaﬁ Libya. Here it is argued that dominant state-centric approaches to justice
obscure local sites of contestation and resistance to statebuilding that contributed to a
return to armed conﬂict in the years following Qadhaﬁ’s October 2011 ousting. Further-
more, this article also highlights the nexus between transitional justice and peacebuilding
by examining how external justice interventions failed to resonate among Libyans.
Drawing upon ﬁeldwork conducted in Libya during January 2013, which included inter-
views conducted at the Ministry for Families of Martyrs and Missing Persons, the Free
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Media Centre in Tripoli, representatives of international organizations in Libya, and
additional discussions outside of Libya with Libyan civil society practitioners, academics
and ofﬁcials from 2013 to 2015, this article examines Libyan demands for justice alongside
assumptions that underlie transitional justice practice, in particular, and peacebuilding
more broadly.1
This contribution begins with an overview of transitional justice and peacebuilding
before going on to explore local justice discourses under Qadhaﬁ. It is noted that
during the later years of Qadhaﬁ’s rule justice demands empowered Islamist voices to
contest Qadhaﬁ’s Jamahariyya, as Qadhaﬁ’s particular brand of autocracy was known.
This empowerment was achieved through the making of martyrs from victims of Qadhaﬁ’s
brutality. However, rather than giving voice to victims, Saif al-Islam Qadhaﬁ (Muammar
Qadhaﬁ’s son and for a time the most inﬂuential member of Qadhaﬁ’s inner circle)
sought to co-opt victims’ groups by opening legal processes in which limited claims
could be pursued against the state. Next, transitional justice in the aftermath of the
2011 conﬂict is explored. It is noted that the International Criminal Court’s intervention
brieﬂy resulted in what can be described as an international justice moment. Indeed,
this moment was short-lived as local actors effectively pushed the ICC aside, perhaps
most gruesomely illustrated by Muammar Qadhaﬁ’s murder at the hands of local militia.
This contribution then goes on to highlight how transitional justice discourses in Libya
adopted a form that was both distinct from international practice but also highly
retributive.
Transitional justice discourses in Libya placed an emphasis on martyrs, as a distinct and
symbolic category of victimhood, and demanded the political exclusion of individuals and
groups deemed unsuitable to play a role in crafting a post-Qadhaﬁ state. The result of this
disconnect was that international statebuilding practice, which prescribes a liberal demo-
cratic endpoint to transitions from conﬂict, served to mobilize multiple sites of resistance
that could draw upon sub-national and supra-national identities and ideologies to chal-
lenge externally driven attempts to statebuild successive internationally recognized gov-
erning authorities. In part, this was because statebuilding processes disempower voices
that advance alternative political orders that do not privilege the state, and which fall
outside liberal democratic and market economy-based modes of governance (Chandler
2006).2 Therefore, as is discussed in the following section, in societies marked with deep
legacies of structural violence and inter-group disparities, transitional justice as a building
block for liberal statebuilding can prove more corrosive than restorative to already frayed
social bonds. And resistance to international norms and practices of transitional justice
should be interpreted not as recalcitrance, but rather as attempts to advance alternative
political orders (Arnould 2016).
Transitional justice, statebuilding and peacebuilding
Numerous studies have highlighted transitional justice’s vulnerability to ‘instrumentaliza-
tion’ or ‘hijacking’ on the part of local elites who are portrayed as recalcitrant or external
actors who fail to take a principled stand when promoting transitional justice abroad
(Peskin 2008; Subotic 2009). This contribution argues that transitional justice’s instrumen-
talization is symptomatic of the ﬁeld’s emergence from within a liberal peace paradigm
that prescribes state-building as a conﬂict resolution tool (Sharp 2015, 155–159).3 To be
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sure, over the past decades liberal peacebuilding has become deeply embedded in a state-
centric peacebuilding practice. Beginning with former United Nations Secretary-General
Boutros Boutros-Ghali’s 1992 Agenda for Peace, in which Boutros-Ghali embraced post-
conﬂict peacebuilding as a pillar of the post-Cold War United Nations (Helman and
Ratner 1992–93, 7), peacebuilding for the United Nations took on an almost exclusively
statist form (Martin 2016). Nevertheless, despite statebuilding’s repeated failures (Chandler
2006; Richmond and Franks 2009), transitional justice advocacy and the international
donor community continue to prescribe state-centric transitional justice processes,
within a wider framework of rule of law programming, for societies where the act of
state-building and understandings of political authority are highly contested, and draw
upon political traditions that contest the legitimacy of the nation-state. Indeed, existing
literature often frames transitional justice interventions in the context of building new
institutions to displace existing social orders that are framed as having formed as
coping mechanisms for conﬂict (Chesterman 2005, 154–164).
The result is that ostensibly neutral transitional justice norms and standards, such as
those set out by the United Nations in 2010, are integrated into state-building processes
that are inherently exclusionary and divisive for societies with competing sub-national and
supra-national sites of resistances to the state (Arnould 2016). As Leebaw (2008, 117)
points out, transitional justice aims both to be responsive to local practices, but also to
transform and displace these practices associated with past violence. This inherent
tension, whereby transitional justice serves the dual goals of legitimation in the context
of local practices and legitimation of the state, has generated a growing interest in local
justice practices (Thomson and Nagy 2014, 11–30). Nevertheless, transitional justice’s
focus remains narrowly framed by its troubleshooting approach to resolving legal dilem-
mas emerging from transitional processes following a period of authoritarian rule, conﬂict
or both. Thus, despite efforts to bridge transitional justice practice and peacebuilding
(Lambourne 2009, 28–48), transitional justice remains far from transformative. As
Gready and Robins (2014, 2) point out, the balance sheet for transitional justice remains
‘at best ambiguous and at times disappointing, critiqued for example, for treating the
symptoms rather than the causes of conﬂict’.
It is the failure to problematize teleological assumptions underlying how we think
about transition within the democratic transition paradigm (Linz and Stepan 1996) and
theoretical models of human rights norm socialization (Risse and Sikkink 1999, 1–38;
Sikkink 2011, 96–125), that has contributed to the reproduction of a body of practice
that is ill suited to addressing the underlying causes of conﬂict. Indeed, democratization
scholarship, and its contemporary practice, emerged from political transitions from mili-
tary to civilian rule in Latin America. These scholarly frameworks and practices were
later applied to understanding transitions from single party communist rule in Central
and Eastern Europe. In the end, they provide far too narrow a conceptual framework for
understanding contemporary transformations in societies where statehood is contested,
or displaces alternative political orders. It is statebuilding’s challenge to longstanding
social bonds and ideologies, which both precede and supersede the modern state, that
makes statebuilding an abjectly non-neutral project. As Sadiki (2009) noted in his critique
of Western democratization policies crafted toward the Arab Middle East, these frame-
works were too deeply embedded in Western notions of statehood and democratic prac-
tice to ﬁnd transformative resonance in the Middle East. For example, in Libya alone, a
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myriad of groups ranging from the Libyan Muslim Brotherhood and the Libyan Islamic
Movement for Change to Ansar al-Sharia have all voiced opposition to attempts to miti-
gate the place of Islamic law in the making of a new Libya. Thus, in addition to the
West lacking any material leverage over Libya’s post-Qadhaﬁ elites (Boduszynski 2015),
at an ideational level, even if the West did muster the political will to impose democratic
preferences, this would have only deepened conﬂict among Libya’s competing political
actors who lacked a shared vision of the Libyan state.
Justice advocacy under Qadhaﬁ: contesting the Jamahariyya
Demands for justice had long played a crucial role in mobilizing resistance to Qadhaﬁ’s
regime in Libya’s marginalized eastern regions (Chorin 2012, 148), and also highlighted
contested visions of Libyan statehood. To be sure, the 1996 Abu Selim prison massacre,
which claimed over 1,250 lives, left a deep imprint in Libya’s east. A majority of victims
at Abu Selim, who would come to be acknowledged as martyrs, came from in, or near,
the eastern communities of Benghazi and Derna. In fact, during the 1990s, eastern
Libya was at the epicentre of a conﬂict waged between the Libyan state and the Al
Qaeda-afﬁliated Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG), Al Jama’a al Islamiyyah al Muqatilah
ﬁ Libya. The LIFG, from its strongholds in eastern Libya, waged an internal armed conﬂict to
overthrow the Qadhaﬁ regime and also provided ﬁghters to Al Qaeda-afﬁliate groups in
Afghanistan, Algeria and Iraq. Later, the LIFG reconstituted itself as the Libyan Islamic
Movement for Change (LIMC) and joined ranks with the opposition National Transitional
Council (NTC) in Benghazi during the 2011 conﬂict to bring about Qadhaﬁ’s ousting.
The integration of former LIFG ﬁghters into the anti-Qadhaﬁ ranks, which at the time
also included senior ofﬁcers who had defected from Qadhaﬁ’s armed forces, imported sig-
niﬁcant ideological and inter-personal divisions into the revolutionary militias, known as
thuwwar. In 2011, the NTC presided over disparate militias that included both former
army ofﬁcers from Qadhaﬁ’s armed forces, which waged a brutal military campaign
against the Islamist LIFG in the east, and former LIFG leaders who waged a violent cam-
paign to establish an Islamic state. From the perspective of former Islamist ﬁghters from
the LIFG, the NTC under the leadership of Mahmud Jabril, a former close associate of
Saif al-Islam Qadhaﬁ, had the appearance of being led by senior defectors from the
Qadhaﬁ regime rather than genuine revolutionaries.
It must be acknowledged, however, that Libya’s Islamists are far from monolithic.
Indeed, Islamist voices in Libya include groups that range from the electorally minded
Muslim Brotherhood, which traces its origins in Libya to a student movement and main-
tains close ties with the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, to groups such as Ansar al-
Sharia that rejected elections and called for the imposition of sharia (Fitzgerald 2015,
178, 201), and whose youth council joined the so-called Islamic State in 2014. Nonetheless,
all of these groups demanded more transformative political change than the cosmetic
reconﬁguration of Qadhaﬁ’s Libya under the leadership of reformist regime defectors.
The hostility of revolutionary ﬁghters, who formed militias with names such as the Abu
Selim Martyrs’ Brigade, towards those perceived as having close ties with the Qadhaﬁ
regime illustrates two important dimensions of transitional justice debates that would
emerge later in 2011. The ﬁrst was ideological and operated at a supra-national level. Isla-
mists wanted a more fundamental uprooting of the state and for new institutions to be
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established in compliance with Islamic law, albeit in practice this meant different things to
Libya’s Islamists. References to Islamic law, and Islamic political thought, brought Islamist
movements into conﬂict not only with rival local actors, but would also frame a conﬂict
between Islamists and an external community of professionalized rule of law practitioners
who sought to transpose Euro-centric notions and vocabularies of democratization and
justice to Libya’s transition. However, as Sadiki (2009) cautioned in his study of democra-
tization in the Arab Middle East, the paradigms that internationals brought with them to
the region were not neutral. Sadiki reminds us that ‘Knowledge-making practices in the
study of Arab politics are not neutral: They are embedded in the historically biased attitude
of Euro-American ideas towards Islam and Arabism’(2009, 11). Western knowledge-making
practices thus reinforced the exclusion of local sources of authority that did not fall within
Western conceptions of the liberal state. For example, local Islamic institutions, such as
Ofﬁce for Islamic Legal Opinions, Dar al-Ifta, were constructed as threatening human
rights and the rule of law (Advocates for Human Rights 2015), despite the fact that
many of these institutions often enjoyed more local legitimacy than newly created and
externally supported judicial institutions.
Second, at the sub-national level, justice demands also betrayed deep regional and
inter-communal divisions. As early as 2003, Saif al-Islam Qadhaﬁ sought to diffuse
growing unrest in the east by extending an offer of a diluted form of transitional justice
to victims of the regime’s war on the LIFG. This came in the form of acknowledgement
of deaths at Abu Selim. Death notices were for the ﬁrst time issued for families of Abu
Selim detainees. These notices were then followed by the offer of ﬁnancial compensation
to 112 families of Abu Selim victims. It is not coincidental that Saif’s package of measures
for the Abu Selim families occurred at a time when Libya began a process of adopting the
features of liberal statehood as part of its process of reconciliation with the United States
and the United Kingdom in the form of a discussion of a new constitution (Chorin 2012,
151–155), which had it ever been drafted would have been Libya’s ﬁrst constitution
since 1951.
Nevertheless, Saif’s attempt to balance the regime’s need to protect those implicated in
the Abu Selim massacre against demands for justice failed to placate victims’ families who
continued to push for accountability and acknowledgment, not just ﬁnancial compen-
sation. In 2007, 30 victims’ families ﬁled a claim against the Libyan government in the
North Benghazi Court. Later, in 2008, Fathi Terbil, a Benghazi lawyer, established the
Coordination Committee for Families of Victims (Chorin 2012, 153). From 2008 until
2011, the families of Abu Selim victims remained active in pushing for accountability. In
2009 the families even published a list of demands, which included the prosecution of
those responsible for the prison massacre (Chorin 2012, 154).
The Abu Selim case imparts two more important lessons for understanding justice
demands in post-Qadhaﬁ Libya. First, it is an illustrative example of the fact that caricatures
of the Qadhaﬁ regime which emphasize the almost comical excesses of its leader, or
present Libya as being left tabula rasa for an internationally guided statebuilding
project, underplay signiﬁcant legacies of the past (Vandewalle 2015, 17–30) that compli-
cated efforts to establish a post-Qadhaﬁ state around the NTC.
Second, Abu Selim also helps us understand the symbolism of notions of martyrdom,
which will be discussed in greater detail later, and the deep distrust Libya’s Islamists
held towards Libyan institutions around which a state was to be built. First among
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these was the NTC. In 2011, the international community swiftly recognized non-Islamist
technocrats who had defected from the Qadhaﬁ regime as the internationally recognized
governing authority for all of Libya. Indeed, at the time it appeared as if defectors from the
Qadhaﬁ regime would guide Libya’s transition process, and in effect continue the liberal
reform programme initiated under Saif al-Islam, but prematurely terminated by
Muammar Qadhaﬁ.
With the NTC led by Mahmud Jabril, a US-educated former head of Libya’s National
Economic Development Board, and its surrogate armed forces led by Qadhaﬁ’s former
Minister of Interior General Abd al-Fattah Yunis,4 many of those engaged in ﬁghting Qad-
haﬁ’s forces during the summer of 2011, such as former LIFG leader Abdelhakim Belhaj,
appeared far removed from the political process of statebuilding unfolding in Benghazi.
Moreover, the fact that the NTC’s representatives cultivated their support in western capi-
tals and issued policy declarations with a Western audience in mind, while Islamist leaders
in turn gathered in Istanbul to negotiate a radically different vision of a future Libya also
underscores how contested post-Qadhaﬁ state-building would be once the ﬁghting ended
in October 2011.
Libya highlights how contested visions of statehood make state-centric peacebuilding
and transitional justice practices corrosive to attempts to bring conﬂicted political actors
together in the aftermath of conﬂict. The liberal state is a particular form of governance
that is often highly contested, and statebuilding efforts will inevitably act to empower
one set of local actors at the expense of another. As the next sections will illustrate, transi-
tional justice came to assume greater salience as a statebuilding tool because of its ability
to disempower those who sought to challenge the new state.
After the Jamahariyya: Islam, the state and justice
In October 2011 Libya’s NTC was stacked with former regime technocrats and reformists
who guided Libya’s transition process through a war waged against Qadhaﬁ loyalists.
However, with Libya’s new leaders having close ties to the old regime, formerly margina-
lized political voices began to look to transitional justice as a means to disempower a new
elite that was perceived as being too close to the old order. In fact, in 2011, a leading Isla-
mist ﬁgure pointed out, ‘This was not an NTC that represented all of Libya. The real Libya.
… Libya is a conservative country; how come there were not conservative people in the
NTC?’ (Fitzgerald 2015, 183). For Libya’s disparate Islamist voices, the principal unifying
factor was the call for sharia, or Islamic law, to be the source of all legislation in the
new Libya.5 In addition, many inﬂuential Libyan Islamists had spent time in Afghanistan,
Algeria and Iraq. However, Ashour (2012, 6) argues that many of those who fought
abroad returned disillusioned by the warlordism that marred these conﬂicts and viewed
the collapse of Qadhaﬁ’s state as an opportunity to focus their efforts on Islamist politics
at home.
Indeed, this early contestation of the legitimacy of Libya’s NTC, which won international
recognition during the 2011 conﬂict but was widely perceived by armed groups ﬁghting
on its behalf as illegitimate, highlighted the divide between those in Libya whom the inter-
national community saw as interlocutors and those who sought to establish alternative
political orders. The uncomfortable fact that the NTC enjoyed international recognition
but lacked domestic legitimacy was visible even prior to the fall of Tripoli, as the NTC
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proved unable to exercise control over the myriad of groups that had by mid-2011 taken
up arms against Qadhaﬁ. While elections for the NTC’s successor governing authority, the
General National Congress (GNC), brought about Libya’s ﬁrst peaceful transfer of power in
the country’s modern history, as the NTC chose not to contest the 2012 elections, the
sense of optimism that the new legislature would be able to guide a statebuilding
process with a minimal international ‘footprint’ was quickly dashed. In the end, political
decision-making was made not within the legislative body, but on the streets of Tripoli
where armed groups held ministries hostage in return for legislation that would prescribe
vengeance for those identiﬁed as remnants of the old regime, impunity to those con-
sidered revolutionaries, and symbolic recognition and compensation for families of
those identiﬁed as martyrs. In fact, when elections were held for the GNC’s successor par-
liament, the House of Representatives (HoR), in 2014, Libya was already again in a state of
civil conﬂict. The refusal of the GNC to recognize the election of its successor government,
and the HoR’s exile to Tobruk, left Libya in 2015 as a country with two competing govern-
ments vying for both domestic and international legitimacy and a myriad of armed groups,
over which neither parliament can exercise effective control.
There is no question that Qadhaﬁ left Libya with overlapping legacies of violence that
transcend Islamist politics, ranging from structural violence that pitted Libya’s regions,
tribes and various other communities against each other through unequal access to the
nation’s resource wealth to widely publicized public killings, some of which were televised
by the regime to a national audience. The United Nations Support Mission in Libya
(UNSMIL) recognized the urgency of transitional justice for Libya, and it made transitional
justice a key priority for the new mission. Although UNSMIL was not a governing body, its
mandate restricted it to providing assistance to local elites and it could not directly inter-
vene in Libya’s governance, UNSMIL nonetheless attempted to shape the country’s transi-
tional justice process. In a report released just one year following the end of the six-month
conﬂict waged in 2011, UNSMIL argued, ‘the transition to building a new Libya requires
coming to grips with the past and facilitating reconciliation based on principles of transi-
tional justice’ (2012, 1). Signiﬁcantly, this report did not make a single reference to Islamic
political thought or traditions and instead provided a catalogue of past crimes followed by
a diagnosis in the form of proposed transitional justice mechanisms and truth-seeking pro-
cesses. The NTC subsequently adopted a number of laws to establish a national framework
for dealing with the past. For example, Law No. 17, adopted in 2012, on the Establishment
of Rules of National Reconciliation and Transitional Justice signalled Libya’s ﬁrst national
transitional justice law, while Law No. 26, also adopted in 2012, put in place a system of
vetting for public ofﬁcials.
However, UNSMIL’s attempt to provide an international best practice framework for
locally initiated transitional justice legislation sat uncomfortably beside the widespread
perception among Libyans that transitional justice was primarily about acknowledgement
of martyrs and the discrediting and disempowerment of former regime ofﬁcials rather
than a tool for rule of law promotion. Of course, regardless of UNSMIL’s preferences,
many community leaders had the capacity to prevent the enforcement of transitional
justice measures within their respective communities. Therefore, even with a growing
corpus of transitional justice legislation and dedicated transitional justice institutions
emerging during 2012, by 2014 Hanan Salah’s observation that transitional justice in
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Libya was ‘no more than ink on paper’ (2014) illustrates just how far the gap had grown
between state practice and actual developments on the ground.
Alongside this gap, there was a broader consensus that accounting for the past was to
exclusively target the former regime, although the scope and breadth of this targeting was
contested. Yet, as Qadhaﬁ’s killing illustrated, groups that waged war against Qadhaﬁ under
the revolutionary banner were also implicated in numerous alleged criminal acts of an
international character such as crimes against humanity and war crimes; however, as
emphasized in an interview with a Tripoli-based non-governmental organisation (NGO)
representative in January 2013, for the new post-Qadhaﬁ governing authorities alleged
revolutionary crimes were not to be investigated, or even acknowledged by the GNC.
International criminal justice: complementarity without a state?
The international community helped reinforce the narrative of a cleanly waged revolution-
ary armed struggle against the ancien regime through the International Criminal Court’s
certiﬁcation of arrest warrants against only one side of the conﬂict. Moreover, pronounce-
ments by the ICC Chief Prosecutor Moreno-Ocampo about alleged atrocities that were
popularized within Libya and abroad, such as his singling out of stigmatized ethnic
groups in Libya for having perpetrated mass rape against Arab women—a charge for
which no physical evidence ever emerged—added to a sense of impunity among
Libya’s revolutionary armed groups, which subsequently targeted members of minority
communities for revenge killings.
Thus, although United Nations Security Council Resolution 1970 referred Libya to the
ICC’s jurisdiction, and the court’s rapid intervention in the form of three arrest warrants
against Muammar Qadhaﬁ, Saif al-Islam Qadhaﬁ and Abdullah al-Senussi proved in the
long term to have harmed international justice. To be sure, prosecutorial strategy, in par-
ticular the question of whether to target all sides to a conﬂict, has generated signiﬁcant
controversy at the UN ad hoc tribunals and at the ICC (Peskin 2005) In the case of
Libya, while the 2011 arrest warrants highlighted the apogee of international justice’s
foray into the country, the failure of the court to address serious and systemic crimes per-
petrated on the part of the thuwwar reinforced the perception of immunity among anti-
Qadhaﬁ ﬁghters and diminished the court’s standing as an impartial institution.
Despite Muammar Qadhaﬁ’s arrest warrant’s withdrawal after his death, the ICC effec-
tively abrogated its obligation to seek the transfer of Saif al-Islam Qadhaﬁ and Abdullah al-
Senussi. This abrogation took place in the context of clear evidence of the widespread
practice of torture in Libyan detention centres and the absence of minimal protections
for due process. The admissibility provision of the Rome Statute that established the prac-
tice of complementarity, found in Article 17, set a twofold threshold for admissibility
before the ICC that requires the court to demonstrate that a state judiciary is both unwill-
ing and unable to prosecute a prospective accused in accordance with ‘due process recog-
nized by international law’. Nevertheless, even in the absence of an internationally
recognized government that exercises control over trial chambers in Tripoli, the ICC con-
sistently refused to acknowledge systemic violations of due process in the al-Senussi case
that included denial of access to legal representation and solitary conﬁnement during trial.
In a response to death sentences handed down on 28 July 2015 against Saif al-Islam
Qadhaﬁ and Abdullah al-Senussi, alongside 30 other former Qadhaﬁ regime ofﬁcials, by
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a court afﬁliated with the GNC-led government in Tripoli, Human Rights Watch pointed out
that the entire process was ‘undermined by serious due process violations’ (2015). Yet,
even in the face of ongoing judicial proceedings by a Tripoli-based court acting outside
the authority of Libya’s internationally recognized Justice Ministry, the ICC rejected
requests by al-Senussi’s legal representatives to reinstate the al-Senussi case before the
international judicial body (Human Rights Watch 2014).
As will be highlighted in the next section, international law’s state-centricity, which ima-
gines the ICC as interacting with state counterparts, as opposed to interacting with the
non-state groups that exercise control over detention facilities and courtrooms, such as
the Zintan militia, or even the GNC government in Tripoli, neither of which are internation-
ally recognized as the legitimate governing authority in Libya, has forced international
justice practitioners to invent a ﬁctitious Libyan state. This state, according to ICC judg-
ments, is able to exercise complementarity. However, while the ICC’s failure to pursue
the transfer of accused persons left the court largely irrelevant on the ground, it will be
highlighted in the next section that this irrelevance is symptomatic of the ICC’s interven-
tion taking place in the context of a failed statebuilding project.
Faking a state or making a state
The ICC’s foray into Libya not only highlights the state-centricity of international justice,
which has constructed an ediﬁce of complementarity on the assumption that the ICC
imposes obligations upon states, and interacts with state judiciaries, but also highlights
the inherent weakness of externally supported state institutions that are disruptive to
social orders that operate at the community, tribal or regional levels. Boduszynski and Pick-
ard’s (2013, 86) description of Libyan politics as constituting a form of ‘intense localism’
provides an apt description of the hostility by which local communities viewed any
national authority.
Libya’s layered legacy of violence left Libyans distrustful of political institutions, such as
parliaments and political parties, institutions that are essential components of liberal sta-
tehood (Vandewalle 2015, 17–3). Although this contradiction was noted by internationals
in Tripoli during the ﬁrst months of the post-Qadhaﬁ statebuilding project, the inter-
national community nonetheless invested heavily in strengthening internationally recog-
nized governments, the Benghazi established NTC, the Tripoli-based GNC, and later the
Tobruk-based House of Representatives. Meanwhile, at the same time, none of these
national governments could effectively exercise authority over Libya’s vast territory.
In fact, Libya’s ﬁrst internationally recognized post-Qadhaﬁ governing body came into
existence through the adoption of a political roadmap that more closely mapped on to
the vision for a democratic Libya held by Western states rather than the preferences of
Libyans. Illustrative of this international audience to which the NTC appealed was the fact
the ﬁrst document that set out a governing framework for the Council was written in
English not Arabic (Bartu 2015, 40). The NTC’s leaders were acutely aware of Western prefer-
ences, as many had already familiarized themselves with their Western counterparts as
leading ﬁgures within Saif al-Islam’s reform movement that sought to open Libya to
Western investment during the early 2000s. This close relationship that emerged between
former Qadhaﬁ reformists and the Western diplomatic corps ampliﬁed the resentment of
Libyan Islamists toward the transition and state-building process (Fitzgerald 2015, 183).
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However, before discussing how these resentments ﬁltered into transitional justice
debates, it must be recalled that one of the important legacies of Muammar Qadhaﬁ’s
42-year rule was that Qadhaﬁ skilfully avoided falling into the trap of attempting to
impose a modern state upon Libya. Following Qadhaﬁ’s 1969 coup, Qadhaﬁ never
adopted a new constitution and systematically dismantled institutions of the monarchy.
This new system was constructed around his Green Book ideology, not political parties
or state institutions. Attempting to impose statebuilding was a trap that paradoxically
every post-Qadhaﬁ government has fallen into. Vandewalle succinctly captured Qadhaﬁ’s
aversion to state institutions in 1986:
Its state apparatus, destroyed during Italian occupation and held in abeyance during the mon-
archy, has been declared useless by the jamahariyya. The Green Book undermined the legiti-
macy of an apparatus meant to provide consistent administration. The continuous uprooting
of the domestic bureaucratic organization in many ways reﬂected Qadhaﬁ’s distrust for a
modern state. (35)
At the same time, it was not that the experience of Italian colonialism destroyed a modern
Libyan state, but rather it reinforced social relations at the community and tribal levels as a
form of resistance to an externally imposed political order. In eastern regions this resist-
ance would be embodied in the celebrated martyr Omar Mokhtar, who was executed
by Italian colonial authorities in 1931. After 1969, the effect of the Qadhaﬁ regime’s
attempt to play Libya’s tribal communities off against each other only acted to reinforce
the strengthening of non-state identities and social bonds. Thus, despite Libya’s post-
Second World War monarchy, which was led by the Senussi tribe until Qadhaﬁ’s 1969
coup, having established some antecedents to representative democracy, these antece-
dents were subsumed by 42 years in which the apparatus of the Libyan state was effec-
tively dismantled.
Contested martyrdom and thuuwar justice
It was within the context of a society where notions of modern statehood never coalesced,
or were associated with colonial oppression, that transitional justice practitioners sought
to import lessons learned from political transitions in Latin America and post-communist
Europe to post-Qadhaﬁ Libya. From 2011 until 2014 numerous workshops, training ses-
sions and lectures were organized in Tripoli by international NGOs, international organiz-
ations and foreign governments in order to facilitate the country’s transitional justice
process.
At the same time, it was clear that transitional justice in Libya was not to be impartial.
Article 1 of Libya’s Law on Transitional Justice, adopted in 2013,established a legal frame-
work for accountability to be restricted exclusively to the ancien regime. It stated:
When applying the provisions of this law, transitional justice is meant to address severe and
systematic violations of the basic rights and liberties to which the Libyans were subjected by
state afﬁliated apparatus under the former regime. (Law No. 29, 2013)
Thus, the transitional justice law could not be applied to revolutionary armed groups,
which by this time had already secured the adoption of amnesty legislation. Taken
together with the 2012 amnesty laws (Law No. 35, 2012; Law No. 38, 2012), both the
NTC and later the GNC sent a clear signal that transitional justice was to target the
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apparatus of the old regime. In particular, Law No. 38 on Transitional Period Special
Measures on the one hand referred detainees held in custody after the revolution who
were suspected of loyalty to Qadhaﬁ for prosecution, while on the other hand amnestying
those who committed crimes on the revolutionary side. Law No. 38 provoked a strong con-
demnation from Libyan Lawyers for Justice, a diaspora network of Libyan lawyers, who
argued that the Law’s vague language which amnestied all acts ‘made necessary by the
17 February Revolution’ acted to enshrine a culture of impunity (Libyan Lawyers for
Human Rights 2012). And, with the ICC also not launching any prosecutions for crimes
committed on the part of Libya’s revolutionary armed groups, there was little threat to
revolutionary impunity.
In addition to exclusively targeting the Qadhaﬁ regime, and granting impunity to revo-
lutionary militias, from very early in the process, transitional justice in Libya began to adopt
characteristics that challenged existing international legal norms and standards. This was
apparent in three respects. First, privileging the martyr over the victim, second, adopting a
narrow deﬁnition of disappeared persons, and third, the use of purges.
Martyrs, not victims?
In respect to discourses of martyrdom, Libya’s thuwwar sought to promote measures that
privileged those who died as martyrs, or shaheed, as opposed to victims. This was not sur-
prising given that the symbolism of the martyr has long been utilized by post-colonial Arab
states to legitimize statebuilding projects formed around a single party or individuals (Des-
Georges 2013, 484). The centrality of the martyr in statebuilding discourses makes notions
of martyrdom potentially crucial to understanding how post-conﬂict institutions are legit-
imized in a wide range of settings. In fact, in Tunisia, where discourses of martyrdom were
also privileged, ofﬁcial acknowledgement of a martyr’s status raised expectations for the
redistribution of wealth (DesGeorges 2013, 490–492), and similarly in Bosnia ofﬁcial recog-
nition of martyrdom also played both a symbolic and material function (Bougarel 2007).
While transitional justice scholarship has generated a wide body of literature on victim-
hood and victim-centred approaches to transitional justice (McEvoy 2014; Robins, 2011), or
even the production of victims on the part of transitional justice entrepreneurs (Madlingozi
2010), in the Arab Middle East, and as Bougarel (2007) demonstrates also beyond the Arab
Middle East, discourses of victimhood can also act to privilege the shaheed. To be sure,
martyrs serve as a distinct category that differentiates between victims of abuse and
those who had given their lives in the ostensibly holy cause of revolution (Wierda 2015,
172). This distinction was visibly present in public spaces. For example, the streets of
Tripoli were ﬂooded with images of martyrs who lost their lives during the course of the
armed conﬂict waged from 17 February to 23 October 2011. The salience of the martyr
was also visible in the transitional justice institutions established by Libya’s transitional auth-
orities, and informed to whom compensation could be provided. For example, the GNC’s
refusal to acknowledge any civilian casualties that resulted fromNorth Atlantic Treaty Organ-
isation (NATO) air strikes carried out during 2011 left families of those injured or killed in the
NATO air campaign unable to seek redress from transitional authorities (Fetouri 2014).
The creation of Libya’s Ministry for Martyrs and Missing Persons after the fall of the
Qadhaﬁ regime brought to the forefront this debate that may appear marginal to transi-
tional justice, but was hugely signiﬁcant for Libyans. This debate, centred on the
392 C. K. LAMONT
determination as to whether or not a victim of the conﬂict or of Qadhaﬁ-era abuses could
be considered a martyr, sought to make distinctions among victims. Furthermore, the
notion of martyrdom could not even be bestowed without question to revolutionary ﬁght-
ers, as those killed in friendly ﬁre NATO airstrikes had their martyr status questioned
because they had not died at the hands of Qadhaﬁ loyalists (Fieldwork interview 2013).
The question of martyrdom highlights how the focus of Libya’s transitional justice
process was not to be a dispassionate truth-seeking exercise, or a technical rule of law
capacity-building exercise, but rather it played a crucial role in the empowerment of
armed groups that had deposed Qadhaﬁ. These armed groups also accessed economic
beneﬁts through the Warriors Affairs Commission, which by 2013 had registered over
120,000 revolutionary ﬁghters seeking ﬁnancial assistance; however, it was noted by a
Tripoli-based civil society activist that the number of revolutionary ﬁghters who actually
fought in the 2011 conﬂict was closer to 30,000 (Fieldwork interview 2013).
Deﬁning the disappeared
On the one hand, the international community’s promotion of transitional justice through
the promotion of Libyan efforts to account for the country’s violent past through a holistic
package of transitional justice measures stimulated discussions among civil society as to
how to address Libya’s wide-ranging legacies of human rights abuse. However, efforts
to import international best practices in human rights proved futile at best as local
actors subverted interventions that were perceived as threatening the thuwwar’s domi-
nant position in post-Qadhaﬁ Libya. In fact, Marieke Wierda, who led the UN’s transitional
justice team in Libya, summed up transitional justice in Libya as follows: ‘These approaches
risked exacerbating Libya’s division and will make it more difﬁcult to forge national unity’
(2015, 174). While processes by which transitional justice are instrumentalized by local
elites have been well documented elsewhere (Subotic 2009), this section on the disap-
peared will demonstrate how weak state institutions were not only unable to mediate
salient transitional justice debates that proved disruptive to contested ideologies and
visions of post-Qadhaﬁ Libya.
The question of accounting for thousands of enforced disappearances that took place
during Qadhaﬁ’s 42-year rule was a question that mobilized victims’ communities long
prior to the 17 February revolution in 2011. Families of the disappeared won special rec-
ognition in the form of a dedicated government ministry that was established in 2012, the
Ministry for Families of Martyrs and Missing Persons. However, from the moment the min-
istry ﬁrst sought to establish its mandate, it became clear that disappearances were to be
treated as a historic legacy of the Qadhaﬁ regime, despite the fact that reports of disap-
pearances continued even after the liberation of Tripoli in 2011. Furthermore, and
related to this, was the fact that a vast majority of those being held in detention in
Libya after 2011 were held by armed groups and not the nominal state institutions.
Despite clear evidence of continued disappearances at the hands of revolutionary
thuwwar, the Ministry for Families of Martyrs and Missing Persons could not consider an
individual to be a missing person if the date of their disappearance followed the liberation
of Tripoli on 23 October 2011. Mervat Mhani, an activist from the Free Generation Move-
ment, a youth organization formed to campaign against the Qadhaﬁ regime, pointed out
that ‘enforced disappearances after the liberation of Tripoli are referred to the Ministry of
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Interior’ (Fieldwork interview 2013). And, as noted at the ministry in January 2013, much
like the Law on Transitional Justice, the ministry’s own mandate restricted the scope of
justice to acts perpetrated by the Qadhaﬁ regime (Fieldwork interview 2013). Truth-
seeking in post-Qadhaﬁ Libya was thus severely limited in scope and highlights the
tension noted by Leebaw (2008) between transitional justice’s long-term transformational
goals and their potential destabilizing effects if pushed too hard in the short term.
In addition to the ministry’s restricted scope in terms of mandate, it also proved unable
to gather a national perspective in terms of numbers of disappeared. During a ﬁeldwork
interview conducted at the ministry in January 2013, it was clear that many communities
outside of Tripoli viewed the ministry with suspicion. A ministry ofﬁcial noted that their list
of missing persons from Qadhaﬁ’s 42-year rule only contained 2,300 names as of January
2013. In response to the question of what the ministry is doing to compile a comprehen-
sive list of missing persons, the ofﬁcial stated ‘we cannot access cities that have not regis-
tered their missing’. In short, the newly established ministry was seen more as a
Tripolitanian institution than a national Libyan institution. This meant that, in practice,
the ministry was unable to operate in communities in the south such as Sabha, and was
also unable to hold a planned workshop on the subject of missing persons in Benghazi
due to a combination of institutional distrust and a deteriorating security situation for
representatives from Tripoli-based ministries.
Political isolation
Perhaps the most politically feared mechanism of thuwwar justice, however, was not mar-
tyrdom, or a narrow understanding of who was disappeared, but rather political isolation.
Political isolation in Libya was the local term that was used to describe the legal framework
by which Libya’s post-Qadhaﬁ public institutions were to be purged of individuals who
were formerly afﬁliated with the old regime. This process was to be a Libyan variant of
the transitional justice practice of lustration, deﬁned by David (2011, x) as the screening
or vetting of public ofﬁcials. Lustration processes have generated signiﬁcant controversy
because often individuals are excluded based on past associations (Szczerbiak 2002). On
the one hand, lustration is argued to increase public trust in institutions (Horne 2009),
and to prevent repetition of abuses (United Nations 2006), through vetting individuals
for public ofﬁce. However, lustration processes have often been accompanied by accusa-
tions of political abuse.
Political isolation was in retrospect an unsurprising move on the part of the thuwwar,
who feared a loss of privilege or access to jobs in post-conﬂict Libya. With the international
community bestowing recognition upon weak state institutions cobbled around the newly
elected GNC, Libya’s armed groups needed a means by which they could transition their
military power into the spoils of statehood. As noted earlier, however, the primary obstacle
to this was the inﬂuence Qadhaﬁ regime defectors enjoyed in governing institutions and
in weak state institutions that had survived the fall of the Qadhaﬁ regime.
In addition to purging existing public institutions, which were perceived as being popu-
lated by civil servants who had beneﬁted under Qadhaﬁ, there was also a strong ideologi-
cal dimension to political isolation. The push for a purge of public institutions and those
holding political ofﬁce was led by Libya’s Islamists. Even before the election of the GNC
in 2012, Libya’s Islamists were becoming increasingly hostile toward the direction the
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NTC sought to take Libya’s transition. In particular, Islamists were uncomfortable with pro-
nouncements on the part of technocratic elites suggesting that the NTC was aiming to
draft a new Libyan constitution that did not adequately privilege the place of Islam as
the source of law and authority. Therefore, for Libya’s Islamists, political isolation offered
a roadmap for countering the perceived secular challenge by disempowering competing
ideological currents that did not sufﬁciently recognize Islamist notions of governance.
Libya’s Law No. 13 on Political and Administrative Isolation was adopted by the GNC in
2013. Although the law was ratiﬁed by the GNC, the ratiﬁcation process was highly irregu-
lar. The Misratan militias had effectively held government ministries in Tripoli hostage until
the law’s adoption. In addition, the law itself was highly problematic. It lacked effective
means of enforcement and also dissolved much of the existing state apparatus at the
moment of ratiﬁcation. To be sure, according to Wierda (2015, 159), the political isolation
law more closely resembled a purge than vetting practices delineated by the UN. In retro-
spect, Law No. 13 effectively brought to an end the detente between the thuwwar and the
facade of civilian governance that was established in the midst of the 2011 conﬂict.
In the end, the isolation law, subsequently revoked by the HoR in 2015, but maintained
by the rival GNC, excluded 14 categories of individuals who held ofﬁcial positions under
the old regime and individuals who were involved in particular activities such as the
plunder of property or engaged in activities, scientiﬁc, social or educational, which pro-
moted the ideology of the old regime (Law No. 13). Yet, despite Law No. 13′s broad cat-
egories of exclusion, the absence of effective control over state institutions meant that,
in effect, many of those who were to be excluded maintained their positions, and the
general inability to implement a law that was meant to disempower former regime ofﬁcials
in the end resulted in a further demonstration of post-Qadhaﬁ institutional weakness.
Conclusions
Transitional justice in Libya highlights the urgent need to rethink justice interventions in
polities where state institutions are weak and highly contested. Rather than viewing local
actors as instrumentalizers of transitional justice, peacebuilding and statebuilding prac-
tices should be acknowledged as generating conﬂict between local governance practices
and transitional justice is just one of the axes along which these conﬂicts play out. In states
where legacies of post-colonial contested statehood leave the modern nation state as just
one among many modes of governance advanced by regional political actors, transitional
justice could beneﬁt from a wider interrogation of notions and concepts such as martyr-
dom that fall outside the Western-centric vocabulary that deﬁnes the ﬁeld. Moreover, the
state-centricity of transitional justice as a component of statebuilding practice, which pri-
vileges external normative frameworks and standards at the expense of local knowledge,
focuses on judicial processes, and promotes the establishment of governmental bodies to
account for the past, has proven divisive in contexts where notions of statehood are con-
tested. The privileging of state authority on the part of international actors thus not only
increases the incentives on the part of local actors to capture nominal state institutions,
but also deepens divisions among those advancing alternative notions of statehood,
such as for example those articulated by Libya’s Islamists. As witnessed in Libya, legislation
on political isolation turned transitional justice into a highly divisive political project, which
was more about state capture than statebuilding.
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Furthermore, teleological approaches to transitional justice are unable to cope with the
complexities of justice demands in societies where strong sub-national or supra-national
identities challenge the legitimacy of the state. In the case of Libya, we witnessed both,
with the intense localism that deﬁnes thuwwar politics creating situations whereby the
ICC was confronted with its most sought-after war crimes suspect being held in the
custody of the Zintan militia, as opposed to the state. With a fractured domestic judiciary,
where the courtrooms and the Ministry of Justice might not answer to the same governing
authority, the ICC has relied on the ﬁction of Libyan statehood to relinquish itself of its own
obligation to Saif al-Islam Qadhaﬁ and Abdullah al-Senussi for crimes against humanity.
Finally, the privileging of the martyr in Libyan transitional justice discourses problema-
tizes Western notions of the victim and victimhood. Martyrdom in the case of the Abu
Selim families symbolized the death of individuals in their struggle for the establishment
of a more just state at the hands of a non-Islamic regime. For those who died ﬁghting the
Qadhaﬁ regime in 2011, a similar parallel was drawn. The recognition of martyrdom was
therefore a reafﬁrmation of the revolutionary struggle in 2011 as having been a struggle
that pitted Islamic revolutionary ﬁghters against the Jamaharriya. Libya’s making of
martyrs constitutes a powerful demonstration of how notions drawn from Islamism act
contest those drawn from Western liberal democracy, the latter constituting a form of
knowledge that contains historically charged biases against forms of knowledge emerging
from the former (Sadiki 2009, 11). Libya therefore provides an important lesson for transi-
tional justice and statebuilding practice in societies where there is no consensus as to the
endpoint of transition.
Notes
1. Fieldwork conducted in Libya was supported by a grant from the Ofﬁce of Public Affairs at the
US embassy in Tripoli. Interviews were conducted with representatives of both international
organizations and NGOs, including the United Nations Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL),
the Public International Law Group, No Peace Without Justice, and local justice practitioners,
which included representatives of the General National Congress (GNC) and local NGOs based
in Benghazi and Tripoli.
2. For more on the economic dimension of the liberal transition paradigm, in particular in
relation to its narrowing privileging of bodily harm crimes over socioeconomic crimes, see
Lai (2016).
3. For a broader application of this argument see Gready and Robins (2014, 3). Also see Rich-
mond and Franks (2009) and Paris (2004).
4. Abd al-Fattah Yunis was killed on 28 July 2011 following his recall from the frontlines to Ben-
ghazi. Although the circumstances of his death remain unclear, many close to Yunis believe
that he was killed by former LIFG ﬁghters in revenge for the role he played as Qadhaﬁ’s min-
ister of interior.
5. In relation to sharia as the source of legislation, Esposito (1998, 325) reminds us that unlike in
Western political thought where legislation reﬂects the popular will, in Islamic political
thought limitations are placed on the laws and policies of governments. More speciﬁcally,
all legislation must be in conformance with Sharia and the state cannot enact laws that are
contradictory to it.
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